On September 30, 1938, the famous Munich Agreement was signed, better known in Russian historical literature as the Munich Agreement. In fact, it was this agreement that became the first step towards the start of World War II. British Prime Ministers Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Ministers Edouard Daladier, German Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini signed a document according to which the Sudetenland, formerly part of Czechoslovakia, was transferred to Germany.

The interest of the German Nazis in the Sudetenland was explained by the fact that a significant German community (by 1938 - 2.8 million people) lived on its territory. These were the so-called Sudeten Germans, who are the descendants of the German colonists who settled the Czech lands in the Middle Ages. In addition to the Sudetenland, a large number of Germans lived in Prague and some other large cities in Bohemia and Moravia. As a rule, they did not define themselves as Sudeten Germans. The very term "Sudet Germans" appeared only in 1902 - with the light hand of the writer Franz Jesser. This is how the rural population of the Sudetenland called themselves, and only then did the urban Germans from Brno and Prague join them.

After the First World War and the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans did not want to be part of the Slavic state. Nationalist organizations appeared among them, including the National Socialist Workers' Party of R. Jung, the Sudeten German Party of K. Henlein. Nutrient environment for the activities of the Sudeten nationalists was the student environment of the university, where the division into Czech and German departments was preserved. The students tried to communicate in their own language environment, and subsequently even in parliament, German deputies had the opportunity to speak in their native language. Nationalist sentiments among the Sudeten Germans were especially intensified after the National Socialist Workers' Party came to power in Germany. The Sudeten Germans demanded that they secede from Czechoslovakia and join Germany, explaining their demand by the need to free themselves from the discrimination that allegedly took place in the Czechoslovak state.

In fact, the Czechoslovak government, which did not want to quarrel with Germany, did not discriminate against the Sudeten Germans. It supported local self-government and education in German, but these measures did not suit the Sudeten separatists. Of course, Adolf Hitler also drew attention to the situation in the Sudetenland. For the Fuhrer, Czechoslovakia, which was the most economically developed country in Eastern Europe, was of great interest. He had long looked at the developed Czechoslovak industry, including military factories that produced a large amount of weapons and military equipment. In addition, Hitler and his comrades in the Nazi Party believed that the Czechs could be easily assimilated and subjected to German influence. The Czech Republic was seen as a historical sphere of influence of the German state, control over which should be returned to Germany. At the same time, Hitler relied on the disunity of the Czechs and Slovaks, supporting Slovak separatism and national conservative forces, which were very popular in Slovakia.
When the Anschluss of Austria took place in 1938, the Sudeten nationalists set about trying to carry out a similar operation with the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. The head of the Sudeten German Party, Henlein, arrived in Berlin on a visit and met with the leadership of the NSDAP. He received instructions on how to proceed and, returning to Czechoslovakia, immediately set about developing a new party program, which already contained a demand for autonomy for the Sudeten Germans. The next step was to put forward a demand for a referendum on the accession of the Sudetenland to Germany. In May 1938, units of the Wehrmacht advanced to the border with Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Sudeten German Party was preparing a speech with the aim of separating the Sudetenland. The authorities of Czechoslovakia were forced to conduct a partial mobilization in the country, send troops to the Sudetenland and enlist the support of the Soviet Union and France. Then, in May 1938, even fascist Italy, which at that time already had allied relations with Germany, criticized the aggressive intentions of Berlin. Thus, the first Sudeten crisis ended for Germany and the Sudeten separatists in the fiasco of their plans to tear away the Sudetenland. After that, German diplomacy began active negotiations with Czechoslovak representatives. Poland played its role in supporting the aggressive plans of Germany, which threatened the Soviet Union with war if the USSR sent units of the Red Army to help Czechoslovakia through Polish territory. The position of Poland was explained by the fact that Warsaw also claimed part of the Czechoslovak territory, like Hungary, neighboring Czechoslovakia.

The time for a new provocation came at the beginning of September 1938. Then in the Sudetenland there were riots organized by the Sudeten Germans. The Czechoslovak government deployed troops and police to suppress them. At this time, fears arose again that Germany would send parts of the Wehrmacht to help the Sudeten nationalists. Then the leaders of Great Britain and France confirmed their readiness to help Czechoslovakia and declare war on Germany if she attacked a neighboring country. At the same time, Paris and London promised Berlin that if Germany did not start a war, she would be able to claim any concessions. Hitler realized that he was close enough to his goal - the Anschluss of the Sudetenland. He stated that he did not want war, but he needed to support the Sudeten Germans as fellow tribesmen persecuted by the Czechoslovak authorities.

Meanwhile, provocations in the Sudetenland continued. On September 13, Sudeten nationalists again began riots. The Czechoslovak government was forced to impose martial law on the territory of German-populated areas and to strengthen the presence of its armed forces and police. In response, the Sudeten German leader Henlein demanded that martial law be lifted and that Czechoslovak troops be withdrawn from the Sudetenland. Germany announced that if the government of Czechoslovakia did not comply with the demands of the leaders of the Sudeten Germans, it would declare war on Czechoslovakia. On September 15, British Prime Minister Chamberlain arrived in Germany. This meeting, in many ways, was decisive for the future fate of Czechoslovakia. Hitler managed to convince Chamberlain that Germany did not want war, but if Czechoslovakia did not give up the Sudetenland to Germany, thereby realizing the right of the Sudeten Germans, like any other nation, to self-determination, then Berlin would be forced to stand up for fellow tribesmen. On September 18, representatives of Great Britain and France met in London, who came to a compromise solution, according to which the areas inhabited by more than 50% Germans were to go to Germany - in accordance with the right of nations to self-determination. At the same time, Great Britain and France undertook to become guarantors of the inviolability of the new borders of Czechoslovakia, which were established in connection with this decision. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union confirmed its readiness to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even if France did not fulfill its obligations under the alliance treaty with Czechoslovakia, concluded in 1935. However, Poland also reaffirmed its old position - that it would immediately attack Soviet troops if they tried to pass through its territory into Czechoslovakia. Great Britain and France blocked the proposal of the Soviet Union to consider the Czechoslovak situation in the League of Nations. So the conspiracy of the capitalist countries of the West took place.

French representatives told the Czechoslovak leadership that if they did not agree to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, then France would refuse to fulfill its allied obligations to Czechoslovakia. At the same time, French and British representatives warned the Czechoslovak leadership that if they used the military assistance of the Soviet Union, the situation could get out of control and Western countries would have to fight against the USSR. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was trying to make one last attempt to protect the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. The military units stationed in the western regions of the USSR were put on alert.

At a meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler on September 22, the Fuhrer demanded that the Sudetenland be transferred to Germany within a week, as well as those lands claimed by Poland and Hungary. Polish troops began to concentrate on the border with Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia itself, turbulent events also took place. Milan Goggia's government, determined to capitulate to German demands, fell in a general strike. A new provisional government was formed under the leadership of General Yan Syrov. On September 23, the leadership of Czechoslovakia gave the order to start a general mobilization. At the same time, the USSR warned Poland that the non-aggression pact could be terminated if the latter attacked Czechoslovak territory.

But Hitler's position remained unchanged. On September 27, he warned that the next day, September 28, the Wehrmacht would come to the aid of the Sudeten Germans. The only concession he could make was to hold new negotiations on the Sudeten question. On September 29, the heads of governments of Great Britain, France and Italy arrived in Munich. It is noteworthy that representatives of the Soviet Union were not invited to the meeting. They also refused to invite representatives of Czechoslovakia - although the issue under discussion was the most concerned with it. Thus, the leaders of four Western European countries decided the fate of a small state in Eastern Europe.

At one in the morning on September 30, 1938, the Munich Agreement was signed. The partition of Czechoslovakia took place, after which representatives of Czechoslovakia itself were admitted into the hall. They, of course, expressed their protest against the actions of the participants in the agreement, but after a while they yielded to the pressure of the British and French representatives and signed the agreement. The Sudetenland was ceded to Germany. The President of Czechoslovakia Beneš, afraid of the war, on the morning of September 30 signed the agreement adopted in Munich. Despite the fact that in the Soviet historical literature this agreement was regarded as a criminal conspiracy, in the end one can speak of its dual nature.

On the one hand, Germany at first sought to protect the right of the Sudeten Germans to self-determination. Indeed, after the First World War, the German people found themselves divided. The Germans, like any other people in the world, had the right to self-determination and to live in a single state. That is, the movement of the Sudeten Germans could be considered as a national liberation movement. But the whole problem is that Hitler was not going to stop at the Sudetenland and limit himself to protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans. He needed the whole of Czechoslovakia, and the Sudetenland issue became only an excuse for further aggression against this state.

Thus, the other side of the Munich agreements is that they became the starting point for the destruction of Czechoslovakia as a single and independent state and for the occupation of the Czech Republic by German troops. The ease with which the Western powers allowed Hitler to carry out this cunning maneuver inspired him with self-confidence and allowed him to act more aggressively in relation to other states. A year later, Poland received a reward for its position in relation to Czechoslovakia, which itself was occupied by the troops of Nazi Germany.

The criminal behavior of Great Britain and France was not that they allowed the Germans of the Sudetenland to reunite with Germany, but that Paris and London turned a blind eye to Hitler's further aggressive policy towards Czechoslovakia. The next step was the secession of Slovakia, also carried out with the support of Nazi Germany and with the complete silence of the Western states, although they understood that the new Slovak state would actually become a satellite of Berlin. On October 7, autonomy was granted to Slovakia, on October 8 - to Subcarpathian Rus, on November 2, Hungary received the southern regions of Slovakia and part of Subcarpathian Rus (now this part is part of Ukraine). On March 14, 1939, the parliament of the autonomy of Slovakia supported the secession of the autonomy from Czechoslovakia. The conflict between the government of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak leaders was once again exploited by Hitler. The Western powers habitually remained silent. On March 15, Germany sent its troops into the territory of the Czech Republic. The well-armed Czech army did not offer fierce resistance to the Wehrmacht.

Having occupied the Czech Republic, Hitler proclaimed it the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. So the Czech state ceased to exist with the tacit consent of Great Britain and France. The “peace-loving” policy of the powers, which, by the way, guaranteed the inviolability of the new borders of the Czechoslovak state by the same Munich Agreement, led to the destruction of the Czech Republic as a state and, in the long term, significantly brought the tragedy of the Second World War closer. After all, Hitler received what he had achieved even before the “solution of the Sudeten question” - control over the military industry of Czechoslovakia and a new ally - Slovakia, which, in which case, could support the Nazi troops with further advance to the east.


Sources - https://topwar.ru/

Munich Agreement 1938(in Soviet historiography usually Munich agreement; Czech Mnichovska dohoda; Slovak Mnichovska dohoda; German Munchner Abkommen; fr. Accords de Munich; ital. Accordi di Monaco)) - an agreement drawn up in Munich on September 29, 1938 and signed on September 30 of the same year by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini. The agreement concerned the transfer of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany.

background

In 1938, 14 million people lived in Czechoslovakia, of which 3.5 million were ethnic Germans living compactly in the Sudetenland, as well as in Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Germans). The industry of Czechoslovakia, including the military, was one of the most developed in Europe. From the moment of occupation by Germany until the start of the war with Poland, the Skoda factories produced almost as much military products as the entire military industry of Great Britain produced during the same time. Czechoslovakia was one of the world's leading exporters of weapons, its army was superbly armed and relied on powerful fortifications in the Sudetenland.

The Sudeten Germans, through the mouth of the head of the national-separatist Sudeten-German Party, K. Henlein, constantly announced the infringement of their rights by the Czechoslovak government. The government took a number of measures to ensure the representation of the Sudeten Germans in the National Assembly, local self-government, education in their native language, but the tension could not be removed. Based on these statements, Hitler in February 1938 appealed to the Reichstag with an appeal "to pay attention to the appalling living conditions of German brethren in Czechoslovakia."

First Sudeten Crisis

After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, Henlein arrives in Berlin, where he receives instructions on how to proceed. In April, his party adopted the so-called Carlsbad Program, which contained demands for autonomy. In May, the Henleinites intensify pro-German propaganda, put forward a demand for a referendum on the accession of the Sudetenland to Germany, and on May 22, the day of municipal elections, prepare a putsch in order to turn these elections into a plebiscite. At the same time, the Wehrmacht was advancing to the Czechoslovak border. This provoked the first Sudeten Crisis. Partial mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia, troops were brought into the Sudetes and occupied border fortifications. At the same time, the USSR and France declared support for Czechoslovakia (in pursuance of the Soviet-French treaty of May 2, 1935 and the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of May 16, 1935). Even Italy, Germany's ally, protested against the forceful resolution of the crisis. An attempt to tear away the Sudetenland based on the separatist movement of the Sudeten Germans this time failed. Hitler moved on to negotiations. Negotiations were conducted between Henlein and the Czechoslovak government through the mediation of England.

Second Sudeten Crisis

On September 12, 1938, after the failure of negotiations, a second Sudeten crisis was provoked. The Henleinites organized mass demonstrations in the Sudetenland, which forced the government of Czechoslovakia to send troops into the German-populated areas and declare martial law there. Henlein, avoiding arrest, fled to Germany. The next day, Chamberlain sent a telegram to Hitler of his readiness to visit him "for the sake of saving the world." September 15, 1938 Chamberlain arrives for a meeting with Hitler in the city of Berchtesgaden, in the Bavarian Alps. During this meeting, the Fuhrer announced that he wanted peace, but was ready for war because of the Czechoslovak problem. However, war can be avoided if Great Britain agrees to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. Chamberlain agreed with this.

On September 18, Anglo-French consultations were held in London. The parties agreed that territories inhabited by more than 50% of Germans should go to Germany, and that Great Britain and France would guarantee the new borders of Czechoslovakia. On September 20-21, the British and French envoys in Czechoslovakia told the Czechoslovak government that if it did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government would "not fulfill the treaty" with Czechoslovakia. They also reported the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stand aside.” The Czech government refused to comply with these conditions.

September 22 Hitler issues an ultimatum: do not interfere with Germany in the occupation of the Sudetenland. In response, Czechoslovakia and France announce mobilization. On September 27, Hitler, before the threat of the outbreak of war, backs down and sends Chamberlain a letter in which he says that he does not want war, is ready to guarantee the security of the rest of Czechoslovakia and discuss the details of the agreement with Prague. September 29 in Munich, at the initiative of Hitler, he meets with the heads of government of Great Britain, France and Italy. However, contrary to the promise in the letter to Chamberlain, the Czechoslovak representatives were not allowed to discuss the agreement. The USSR was denied participation in the meeting.

Munich Agreement

The meeting in Munich at the Führerbau took place on September 29-30. The basis of the agreement was the proposals of Italy, which practically did not differ in any way from the requirements put forward earlier by Hitler at a meeting with Chamberlain. Chamberlain and Daladier accepted these proposals. At one in the morning on September 30, 1938, Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. After that, the Czechoslovak delegation was admitted to the hall where this agreement was signed. The leadership of Great Britain and France put pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia, and President Benes, without the consent of the National Assembly, accepted this agreement for execution.

Consequences

The rejection of the Sudetenland was only the beginning of the process of dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Poland took part in the division of Czechoslovakia: on September 21, 1938, in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, Polish leaders presented an ultimatum to the Czechs about the “return” of the Teszyn region, where 80,000 Poles and 120,000 Czechs lived. On September 27, another demand was made. Anti-Czech hysteria was being whipped up in the country. On behalf of the so-called "Union of Silesian Insurgents" in Warsaw, recruitment into the Cieszyn Volunteer Corps was quite open. Detachments of "volunteers" then went to the Czechoslovak border, where they staged armed provocations and sabotage, attacked weapons depots. Polish planes violated the border of Czechoslovakia daily. Polish diplomats in London and Paris advocated an equal approach to solving the Sudetenland and Cieszyn problems, while the Polish and German military, meanwhile, were already agreeing on the line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the same day with the conclusion of the Munich agreement, on September 30, Poland sent another ultimatum to Prague and, simultaneously with the German troops, brought its army into the Teszyn region, the subject of territorial disputes between it and Czechoslovakia in 1918-1920. Left in international isolation, the Czechoslovak government was forced to accept the terms of the ultimatum.

Under pressure from Germany, the Czechoslovak government decides on October 7 to grant autonomy to Slovakia, and on October 8 to Subcarpathian Rus.

On November 2, 1938, Hungary, by decision of the First Vienna Arbitration, received the southern (flat) regions of Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Podcarpathian Rus) with the cities of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo and Berehove.

In March 1939, Germany occupied the rest of the territory of Czechoslovakia, incorporating it into the Reich under the name "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia". The Czechoslovak army did not put up any noticeable resistance to the invaders. Germany received significant stocks of weapons from the former Czechoslovak army, which made it possible to equip 9 infantry divisions, and Czech military factories. Before the attack on the USSR, out of 21 Wehrmacht tank divisions, 5 were equipped with Czechoslovak-made tanks.

March 19 - The government of the USSR presents a note to Germany, where it declares its non-recognition of the German occupation of part of the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The agreement signed in Munich was the culminating point of the English "policy of appeasement". One part of historians considers this policy an attempt to rebuild the crisis-ridden Versailles system of international relations through diplomacy, through agreements between the four great European powers. Chamberlain, returning from Munich to London, at the gangway of the plane said: "I brought peace to our generation." Another part of historians believes that the real reason for this policy is an attempt by capitalist countries to crush an alien system at their side - the USSR. For example, British Deputy Foreign Secretary Cadogan wrote in his diary: “Prime Minister ( Chamberlain) declared that he would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets. The slogan of the conservatives at the time was:

On the eve of Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler, on September 10, 1938, Sir Horace Wilson, the Prime Minister's closest adviser on all political matters, invited Chamberlain to declare to the German leader that he highly appreciated the opinion that "Germany and England are the two pillars that maintain peace of order against destructive pressure of Bolshevism", and that therefore he "desires not to do anything that could weaken the rebuff that we can together give to those who threaten our civilization."

Thus, the “appeasement policy” pursued since 1937 did not justify itself: Hitler used England to strengthen Germany, then captured almost the entire continental Europe, after which he attacked the USSR.

Quotes

September 30 marks the 73rd anniversary of the signing of the Munich Agreement, better known in world history as the Munich Agreement. - an agreement signed in 1938 British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, Reich Chancellor of Germany Adolf Hitler and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini supported by the USA .

De jure, this agreement concerned the transfer of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. De facto, this was the first act of conscious support for Hitler by Western European countries, which actually unleashed the Second World War.

Prerequisites

In 1938, 14 million people lived in Czechoslovakia, of which 3.5 million were ethnic Germans living compactly in the Sudetenland, as well as in Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Germans). The industry of Czechoslovakia was one of the most developed in Europe. From the moment of occupation by Germany until the start of the war with Poland, the Skoda factories produced almost as much military products as the entire military industry of Great Britain produced during the same time. Czechoslovakia was one of the world's leading exporters of weapons, its army was superbly armed and relied on powerful fortifications in the Sudetenland.

The Sudeten Germans, led by the national-separatist Sudeten German Party of K. Henlein, constantly stated that their rights were being infringed upon by the Czechoslovak government, despite the fact that the government had taken a number of measures to ensure the representation of the Sudeten Germans in the National Assembly and local self-government. Based on these statements, Hitler in February 1938 appealed to the Reichstag (German parliament) with an appeal "to pay attention to the appalling living conditions of German brethren in Czechoslovakia."

After the Anschluss (forced takeover by Germany) of Austria in March 1938, Henlein arrives in Berlin, where he receives instructions on how to proceed. In April, his party adopted the so-called Carlsbad Program, which contained demands for autonomy. In May, the Henleinists activate pro-German propaganda, put forward a demand for a referendum on the accession of the Sudetenland to Germany, and on May 22, the day of municipal elections, they are preparing a putsch in order to turn these elections into a plebiscite. At the same time, the Wehrmacht was advancing to the Czechoslovak border. This provoked the first Sudeten Crisis. Partial mobilization took place in Czechoslovakia, troops were brought into the Sudetes and occupied border fortifications. At the same time, the USSR and France declared support for Czechoslovakia (as the fulfillment of the Soviet-French treaty of May 2, 1935 and the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of May 16, 1935). Even Italy, Germany's ally, protested against the forceful resolution of the crisis. An attempt to tear away the Sudetenland, relying on the separatist movement of the Sudeten Germans, this time failed. Hitler proceeded to negotiations with the Czechoslovak government through the mediation of the special representative of Great Britain, Lord Runciman.

On September 12, 1938, after the failure of negotiations, a second Sudeten crisis was provoked. The Henleinites organized mass demonstrations in the Sudetenland, which forced the government of Czechoslovakia to send troops into the German-populated areas and declare martial law there.

September 15, 1938 Chamberlain arrives for a meeting with Hitler in the city of Berchtesgaden, in the Bavarian Alps. During this meeting, the Fuhrer announced that he wanted peace, but was ready for war because of the Czechoslovak problem. However, war can be avoided if Great Britain agrees to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. Chamberlain agreed.

On September 18, Anglo-French consultations were held in London. The parties agreed that territories inhabited by more than 50% of Germans should go to Germany, and that Great Britain and France would guarantee the new borders of Czechoslovakia.

On September 20-21, the British and French envoys in Czechoslovakia told the Czechoslovak government that if it did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government would "not fulfill the treaty" with Czechoslovakia. They also reported the following: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stand aside.” The Czech government refused to comply with these conditions.

September 22 Hitler issues an ultimatum: do not interfere with Germany in the occupation of the Sudetenland. In response, Czechoslovakia and France announce mobilization. On September 27, Hitler, before the threat of the outbreak of war, backs down and sends Chamberlain a letter in which he says that he does not want war, is ready to guarantee the security of the rest of Czechoslovakia and discuss the details of the agreement with Prague.

In the photo: Chamberlain (left) and Hitler at a meeting in Bad Godesberg, September 23, 1938

In the photo: Edouard Daladier (center) with Joachim von Ribbentrop at a meeting in Munich in 1938

On September 27, 1938, N. Chamberlain notes that “How terrible, fantastic and implausible is the very idea that we should dig trenches here, at home, and try on gas masks only because people quarreled among themselves in one distant country, oh which we know nothing about. It seems even more impossible that a quarrel already settled in principle can become the subject of war.

"Munich agreement"

September 29-30, 1938. A meeting of the heads of government of England, France, Germany and Italy, convened with the active support of the United States, took place in Munich. The purpose of the meeting was determination of the future fate of the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia, which at that time was one of the most prosperous countries in Europe, since militaristic Germany openly claimed its territory.

It is worth paying attention to the fact that representatives of Czechoslovakia and USSR was denied participation in this meeting.

At one in the morning on September 30, 1938, Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini and Hitler signed the Munich Agreement. Only after that the Czechoslovak delegation was admitted to the hall where this agreement was signed. The leadership of Great Britain and France put pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia, and President Benes, without the consent of the National Assembly, accepted this agreement for execution. On September 30, a declaration of mutual non-aggression was signed between Britain and Germany; a similar declaration by Germany and France was signed a little later - December 6, 1938.

As a result of the agreement, cardinal changes took place in the overall picture of Central Europe - Germany transferred the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia with an area of ​​41 thousand square meters within ten days. km with a population of 4.9 million people.

Commenting on these events, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, wrote to British Foreign Secretary Halifax: "By keeping the peace, we have saved Hitler and his regime." And he was right. But Hitler did not share all his plans with the Allies.

Subsequent events developed no less rapidly.

On March 14, 1939, under pressure from Hitler, the president of the remaining Czech Republic, Hacha, agreed to the occupation by Germany of the lands remaining in the Czech Republic: Bohemia and Moravia. On March 15, Germany brought its troops into the territory of these lands and declared a protectorate over them (Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). The Czech army did not put up any noticeable resistance to the invaders.

Germany received significant stocks of weapons from the former Czechoslovak army, which made it possible to equip 9 infantry divisions, as well as Czech military factories. Before the attack on the USSR, out of 21 Wehrmacht tank divisions, 5 were equipped with Czechoslovak-made tanks.

On March 19, the government of the USSR presented a note to Germany, in which it declared its non-recognition of the German occupation of part of the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Militaristic Poland also took part in the division of Czechoslovakia: on September 21, 1938, in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, Polish statesmen presented an ultimatum to the Czechs about the "return" of the Teszyn region, where 80,000 Poles and 120,000 Czechs lived. On September 27, another demand was made. Anti-Czech hysteria was being whipped up in the country. On behalf of the so-called "Union of Silesian Insurgents" in Warsaw, recruitment into the Cieszyn Volunteer Corps was quite open. Detachments of "volunteers" then went to the Czechoslovak border, where they staged armed provocations and sabotage, attacked weapons depots. Polish planes violated the border of Czechoslovakia daily. Polish diplomats in London and Paris advocated an equal approach to solving the Sudetenland and Cieszyn problems, while the Polish and German military, meanwhile, were already agreeing on the line of demarcation of troops in the event of an invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the same day with the conclusion of the Munich agreement, on September 30, Poland sent another ultimatum to Prague and, simultaneously with the German troops, sent its army into the Teszyn region - the subject of territorial disputes between it and Czechoslovakia in 1918-1920. Left in international isolation, the Czechoslovak government was forced to accept the terms of the ultimatum.

In parallel, in the first half of 1939, fascist Germany assisted in the coming to power in Spain of the pro-fascist Franco regime. And in April, under the leadership of Hitler, fascist Italy occupied Albania.

At the same time, the governments of the Western countries did not particularly try to fight Hitler's "big takeover trend", but in essence simply put up with it and even contributed to it. For example, in the early spring of 1939, Britain, France, and the United States recognized Franco's fascist regime.

Europe hoped that the huge military and industrial potential captured by Germany would be directed against the USSR. And Hitler used England and France to strengthen Germany and capture almost all of continental Europe, and even later - an aggressive attack on the USSR.

As for the USSR, in this situation, unlike all other countries directly or indirectly related to the Munich Agreement, the Soviet Union was the only country that was not hypocritical and openly declared: “The Soviet government cannot recognize as lawful the inclusion of the Czech Republic into the German Empire , and in one form or another also Slovakia...”.

In the photo: During the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Ciano

In April 1939, the Soviet government proposed to conclude a long-term agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR, Britain and France, according to which these three states undertake to provide all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European states lying between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering on the USSR. The Soviet government proposed to start immediately the development of a military convention, which would be signed simultaneously with the political treaty. The proposals of the USSR opened the way to the creation of a stable front of collective security. That is why they proved unacceptable to the Western powers. This once again confirms the real situation in Europe, which wanted to take care only of itself.

Despite such a rapidly developing confrontation, it was not until August 1939 that negotiations opened in Moscow. The Soviet Union proposed a clear plan for the joint conduct of the war against the aggressor, and also expressed its readiness to send 136 divisions to the front. But Europe refused again!

In fact, she was not going to prepare a serious rebuff to Hitler. And she was preparing a completely different strategy - a defensive one: "our subsequent policy should be aimed at deterring Germany and, inflicting decisive blows on Italy, at the same time building up our forces in order to be able to launch an offensive against Germany." Thus, during the negotiations with the Soviet Union, Britain and France not only kept silent about their real plans, but also misled them about the future strategy of fighting the aggressor.

The simple calculation of the Anglo-French politicians was to draw the Soviet Union into the war with Germany, and themselves stay out of the way, at least at the first stage of the war. Britain and France, supported by the United States, were feverishly trying to provoke a war between Germany and the USSR, and in the Far East an undeclared war was already going on between the Soviet Union and Japan. Very soon, this tactic will bring huge losses, primarily for the same France and Britain. “Dividing” Czechoslovakia, Poland and France, literally in a year or two, will themselves fall under the aggression of Nazi Germany, and England and the United States will nevertheless find themselves drawn into the bloodiest war in the history of mankind.

As a distraction, the German government offered the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact, the USSR accepted it, and in August 1939 the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that The Soviet Union was the last major European state to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany..

Even now it is worth considering that this was definitely the right step in the current situation. To be sure, the rejection of the German proposal would immediately plunge the Soviet Union into war with Germany. The pact gave the Soviet Union two valuable things: time and opportunity to better prepare for the rebuff of the aggressor, which was already inevitable. Therefore, now, taking into account the signing of the Munich Agreement in 1938, it is foolish to assert that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed a year later, unleashed a war that was practically already in full swing then. Moreover, from the point of view of the Ukrainian people, it was the signing of the German-Soviet Treaty that ultimately made it possible to reunite Western Ukrainian lands with the greater Ukraine.

Exactly 73 years have passed since the Munich Agreement was signed. Over the years, the entire world community has managed to survive the war, and to form their own conclusions regarding all the events of the pre-war period. Years pass, everything changes, but this is not a reason for the crimes to be forgotten, and the criminals to be justified.

At the same time, it remains obvious that stereotypes and fears in Western European thinking in relation to Eastern Europe have remained. And just as seventy years ago they contributed to Hitler, today they do not allow building a truly new Europe. This is evidenced by the entire history of Ukrainian European integration.

The material was prepared based on publications from the free encyclopedia - "Wikipedia" and other open resources.

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Vilnis Sipols

Sipols Vilnis Yanovich (1923-2002) - Doctor of Historical Sciences, head of the sector of the Institute of History of the USSR / Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.


The Munich Agreement signed 70 years ago, known in Russian literature as the Munich Agreement, is one of the key milestones in the diplomatic prehistory of World War II. And not only because it gave a colossal impetus to the impending catastrophe. "Munich" is also one of the most revealing pages of the pre-war diplomacy of Western democracies. The nature of their policy, their motives and hesitations, their calculations to direct the vector of Nazi conquests to the east - all this comes through here as if in focus. The truth about "Munich" is not only an integral, but also a defining part of the context from which the Soviet-German agreement of 1939 was later born. And this truth is fundamentally at odds with the version that makes the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact responsible for starting the war. We place one of the best brief studies of the history of "Munich". The fact that it was written in Soviet times did not affect its value at all: almost every word here is based on significant documents and sources.

Excerpt from the book: Sipols V.Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II. - M .: International relations, 1979.


Voyage of N.Chamberlain to Berchtesgaden

The ruling elite of England was more and more inclined to give the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany, hoping in this way to achieve mutual understanding between the British Empire and the fascist Reich. On September 7, an editorial in The Times openly raised the question of whether the Czechoslovak government should consider handing over the Sudetenland to Germany.

One of the leaders of the Conservative Party, G. Channon, noted in his diary that this editorial was the result of Halifax's agreement with the publisher of The Times, J. Dawson, and was a "trial balloon" launched to identify the position of the public and prepare it for publication of Runciman's report with similar offers. Halifax said on September 11, 1938, that the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany was the only hope of avoiding war. To resolve this issue, he considered it desirable to convene a conference of four powers - England, France, Germany and Italy.

The question of convening a conference on the same day was discussed by the British ambassador in Paris, E. Phipps, with the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, A. Léger. The French diplomat expressed full agreement with the idea of ​​convening such a conference, specifically noting the undesirability of inviting the Soviet Union to the conference. On September 13, the decision on the expediency of convening an international conference was made at a meeting of the French government. This was immediately reported to London. J. Bonnet believed that the purpose of the conference should be to decide on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and that four Western powers should participate in it. This was a complete renunciation of the Daladier-Bonnet government from the fight against aggression, from allied treaties with the USSR and Czechoslovakia, and capitulation to the fascist Reich.

On September 13, due to the aggravation of the international situation as a result of the fact that fascist agents everywhere began provocative actions in the Sudetenland, at a meeting of the British Prime Minister with "senior ministers", on the initiative of Chamberlain, a decision was made to urgently travel to Germany. On the same day, the British Prime Minister sent a letter to King George VI, in which he stated that the purpose of the trip was to "reach an Anglo-German agreement" and settle the Czechoslovak issue. He emphasized that he intended to put before Hitler the question that Germany and England should become "two pillars of peace in Europe and bulwarks against communism."

In Berlin, of course, they understood that Chamberlain's arrival under those conditions could mean only one thing: England's readiness to make serious concessions. In addition, the Nazis managed to reveal other people's codes, and they were aware of the negotiations between London and Paris, on the one hand, and Prague, on the other. Therefore, the Sudeten Germans openly began to act (of course, at the direction of Hitler) with a demand for the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany, and Hitler simply "played" Chamberlain.

On September 15, N. Chamberlain, accompanied by G. Wilson and W. Strang, arrived in Berchtesgaden. The British Prime Minister began his conversation with Hitler with a statement about his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement and expressed a desire to exchange general views on the policy of both countries. Hitler showed, however, a clear unwillingness to discuss such problems. He reduced all the negotiations to the consideration of a specific issue that interested him. Knowing Chamberlain's position, Hitler resolutely demanded that he transfer the Sudetenland to Germany, threatening a world war otherwise. He also demanded the abolition of Czechoslovakia's mutual assistance treaties with other countries. Chamberlain expressed his readiness to meet these demands, but stated that he must obtain official sanction from his government for this, as well as coordinate the issue with the French government.


Participants of the Munich agreement: Goering, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Hitler, Deladier.

The Berchtesgaden meeting gave Hitler the opportunity to conclude that he had nothing to fear from the opposition of England in connection with his plans to seize the Sudetenland. Moreover, soon after the meeting, the representative of the German Foreign Ministry at Hitler's headquarters, W. Hevel, received information that “Hitler then plans to seize the whole of Czechoslovakia. He is now quite sure that this task can be carried out without the intervention of the British government.

At a meeting with Lord Halifax, Simon and Hoare, after summarizing his negotiations with Hitler, Chamberlain declared that he considered it possible to satisfy Hitler's demand that the Sudetenland be annexed to Germany. He emphasized only the importance of this being carried out in an "orderly manner", that is, not causing an armed conflict. Chamberlain expressed confidence that the settlement of the Sudeten question would pave the way for an Anglo-German agreement.

At a meeting of the heads of government of England and France in London on September 18, it was decided to satisfy Hitler's demand for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. This decision caused confusion even among some representatives of the ruling circles of England.

“It seems monstrous how, with calculated cynicism, we signed up for the destruction of the freedom of 9 million people,” General W. Ironside noted in his diary.

The French ambassador in London, C. Corbin, admitted that the decisions taken by the British and French are the “most shameful” act of the French government in many years. The next day, the Anglo-French accomplices of the fascist aggressors presented the Czechoslovak government with notes containing, in essence, a joint ultimatum demand from Germany, England and France to transfer the Sudetenland to the Reich. At the same time, the British and French governments demanded the consent of Czechoslovakia to replace its treaties on mutual assistance with other countries with a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression, expressing their readiness to take part in this guarantee.

Inviting the British ambassador to his place on September 20 for a top secret conversation, US President F. Roosevelt could not but admit that England and France demanded from Czechoslovakia "the most terrible ruthless sacrifice that has ever been required from any state." At the same time, Roosevelt declared that if the course pursued by the British proved successful, he "would be the first to welcome it." When on the same day the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires asked the American government to publish at least some statement in support of Czechoslovakia, this request was ignored.


The USSR is ready to repulse the aggressor

The position of the USSR was completely different. On September 19, 1938, the Czechoslovak government transmitted to the Soviet government a request to give an answer as soon as possible to the following questions:

a) will the USSR, according to the treaty, provide immediate real assistance if France remains loyal and also provides assistance;

b) whether the USSR will help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations.

Having discussed this request on September 20, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered it possible to give positive answers to both of these questions.

On the same day, the Soviet plenipotentiary in Prague was given the following instructions:

"one. To the question of Beneš, whether the USSR, in accordance with the treaty, will provide immediate and real assistance to Czechoslovakia, if France remains loyal to her and also provides assistance, you can give an affirmative answer on behalf of the government of the Soviet Union.

2. You can give the same affirmative answer to another question ... ".

Plenipotentiary in Prague S. S. Aleksandrovsky immediately conveyed this reply to the Czechoslovak government. France was also made aware of it. Thus, in these difficult and dangerous conditions for Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government once again officially confirmed that the USSR would fulfill its obligations under the pact to assist it in the event of a German attack.

Having considered the question of the position of the Soviet delegation at the forthcoming regular assembly of the League of Nations, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered it necessary that the Soviet representative once again clearly and clearly explain the position of the USSR regarding assistance to Czechoslovakia. In accordance with this decision, M. M. Litvinov, speaking on September 21, 1938 at the assembly of the League of Nations, again detailed the position of the Soviet government on the question of combating aggression. He emphasized that measures should be taken against the aggressor, outlined by the charter of the League of Nations, and decisively, consistently and without hesitation, and then the aggressor would not be led into temptation and "peace would be preserved by peaceful means." M. M. Litvinov in his speech exposed the shameful policy of condoning aggression, when it comes to going to the aggressor “to receive dictates and ultimatums, sacrificing to him the vital interests of this or that state.” The head of the Soviet delegation at the assembly publicly stated the statements that the Soviet government transmitted on September 2 to the government of France and on September 20 to the government of Czechoslovakia.

However, London and Paris still remained deaf to the Soviet proposals. The absurdity of this situation is very clearly shown in Churchill's memoirs.

“Soviet proposals,” he wrote, “were actually ignored... They were treated with indifference, not to say with contempt... Events went on as usual, as if Soviet Russia did not exist. Subsequently, we paid dearly for this.

Fulfilling the urgent instructions of their governments, on the night of September 21, the British and French envoys in Czechoslovakia resolutely declared to the Czechoslovak government that if it did not accept the Anglo-French proposals, the French government "would not fulfill the agreement" with Czechoslovakia. “If the Czechs unite with the Russians,” they stressed, “the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stand aside. Even one of the most influential members of the British government, Samuel Hoare, was subsequently forced to admit that this was one of the most shameless actions in the history of British diplomacy.

Submitting to Anglo-French pressure, the Czechoslovak government capitulated, agreeing to satisfy Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands.

M. M. Litvinov repeatedly confirmed the readiness of the USSR to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia also in conversations with foreign diplomats and political figures. So, on September 22, the People's Commissar had a meeting in Geneva with a member of the British Parliament, Lord Boothby. Returning at once to London, Boothby presented the contents of this conversation to Halifax. Boothby relayed Litvinov's message to him that he had seen the Czechs several times during the past week and each time assured them of the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide effective assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack on it.

“Litvinov considers it desirable also to convene a conference of interested powers,” said Boothby, “and believes that a general ultimatum (British, French and Russian) presented to Germany may still be effective. In his opinion, a firm statement that Russia will take part in the event of a war against Germany is the only means that can impress Herr von Ribbentrop.

MM Litvinov had a conversation in Geneva with the British representatives at the Assembly of the League of Nations, the Lord Privy Seal de la Warre and the Deputy Foreign Minister of England, R. Butler.

Butler telegraphed to the Foreign Office about this conversation: Litvinov declared that "if France enters the war to help the Czechs, the Russians will also come out." He said that he had "long sought to start negotiations between Britain, France and Russia and during this informal meeting would like to propose that we convene a meeting of the named three powers together with Romania and other small states, preferably in Paris, to show the Germans that we are going to act » .

After reading these statements of the People's Commissar in a conversation with de la Warr and Butler, Chamberlain was almost horrified. He saw in them "an enormous danger" (!?), since their implementation could, in his opinion, "strengthen Bolshevism throughout the world."

Over the next four days, the British government met almost continuously, discussing the increasingly complicated situation, but Chamberlain and Halifax did not even mention the proposal of M. M. Litvinov, hiding it from members of the cabinet. De la Warr, who was present at all meetings, was silent on this occasion.

Although the Soviet government could not have known about Chamberlain's reaction to the People's Commissar's proposal, it correctly assessed the situation and possible prospects. On September 23, the NKID wrote to the People's Commissar in response to his message about the conversation with de la Warr and Butler, that it is doubtful that France and England would agree to convene a conference with the participation of the USSR, since they had so far ignored the Soviet Union.

Even many bourgeois politicians and historians were forced to recognize the irreproachability of the position of the USSR with regard to rendering assistance to Czechoslovakia. For example, a prominent figure in the English Conservative Party. Emery noted that "Russia during this entire crisis has taken an absolutely clear position." The Soviet Union, he wrote, "consistently defended the idea of ​​collective security" comrade. The American historian A. Farnia in his study "The Policy of Appeasement" also admits that, unlike England and France, "the Soviet Union really showed full readiness to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia » .

The Soviet government also took a firm and resolute position in connection with the fact that, together with the Nazi aggressors, the Polish ones also acted against Czechoslovakia at that time. As early as April 17, 1938, B. S. Stomonyakov stated that “Poland is more and more openly acting as a de facto participant in the bloc of aggressors. Hurrying not to be late, immediately after the Anschluss, she presented an ultimatum to Lithuania and achieved the forcible establishment of diplomatic and all sorts of other relations with Lithuania, which she ... considers only as the beginning of her gradual development of Lithuania. In the German plans for resolving the Czechoslovak question, Poland plays an active role. She openly provokes an aggravation of the Teszyn issue... Poland, as it is now obvious to everyone, is firmly connected with Germany and will continue to follow its path.

On May 25, 1938, E. Daladier, for his part, informed the Soviet plenipotentiary in Paris, Ya. Z. Surits, that his sounding about the position of Poland in the event of German aggression against Czechoslovakia had given the most negative result. Not only can one not count on support from Poland, Daladier said, but "there is no certainty that Poland will not strike from the rear."

On September 19, 1938, J. Beck sent a message to the Polish ambassador in Berlin, J. Lipsky, that in two days Poland would have significant military forces near the Czechoslovak borders and that he was ready to enter into personal contact with Hitler or Goering on the issue of coordinating the actions of Germany and Poland against Czechoslovakia Comrade. The next day, Lipsky made a corresponding statement to Hitler, emphasizing that Poland, in order to fulfill its demands, would not stop "before the use of force." Hitler assured Lipski that in such a case the Third Reich would be on the side of Poland.

On September 21, the Polish rulers presented the Czechoslovak government with an ultimatum demand that certain areas of Czechoslovakia be transferred to Poland, and also denounced the 1925 Polish-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty. At the same time, the concentration of Polish troops near the Czechoslovak borders continued. The Polish military attache in Paris informed the French general staff that in the event of an invasion of German troops into the Sudetenland, the Poles would occupy, in particular, Slovakia, which would then be divided between Poland and Hungary.

On September 22, the Czechoslovak government, reporting the imminent danger of an attack from Poland, turned to the USSR for support. Responding to this appeal, the very next day the Soviet government handed over to the Polish government a statement that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider this an act of aggression and would denounce the non-aggression pact with Poland. The Czechoslovak envoy in Moscow, Z. Fierlinger, was immediately informed of this statement. Thus, the Soviet Union again came out decisively in defense of Czechoslovakia.

Regarding the policy of the Soviet Union, the English historian J. Wheeler-Bennet wrote: “He used every opportunity to demonstrate his readiness to fulfill his obligations to France and Czechoslovakia. Again and again, to the utter dismay of the British and French governments, this was emphasized in London, Paris, Prague, Geneva, and also in Berlin. According to all available data, Russia's position throughout the Czech crisis was exemplary. She went even further than the letter of her obligations, threatening to revoke her non-aggression pact with Poland if the latter took part in an attack on Czechoslovakia.

And all this happened in conditions when the situation was very dangerous for the Soviet Union itself, since the Polish government was hatching plans for a joint campaign of German and Polish troops against the USSR. The Polish ambassador in Paris, Y. Lukasiewicz, told W. Bullitt on September 25 that “a religious war between fascism and Bolshevism is starting” and that if the Soviet Union provides assistance to Czechoslovakia, Poland is ready for war with the USSR shoulder to shoulder with Germany.

The Polish government is confident, Lukasiewicz said, that “within three months, the Russian troops will be completely defeated and Russia will no longer even be a semblance of a state.”

Romania also took a favorable position for the aggressors. Informing the Italian government of Romania's position, the Romanian envoy in Rome, Zamfirescu, told Italian Foreign Minister Ciano that Romania objected, objects and will object to the passage of Soviet troops through its territory in order to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia. As for the aggravation of relations between Polynia and the USSR because of Czechoslovakia, the Romanian envoy said that "Romania will be on the side of Warsaw and that in any case, an alliance with Poland will take precedence over obligations regarding Prague."

This meant that in the event of an armed conflict that would arise as a result of German and Polish aggression against Czechoslovakia and in which the Soviet Union would participate, Romania, despite the alliance with Czechoslovakia, could be on the side of the aggressors.

Japan also continued to take a threatening position towards the USSR. On September 26, Goering informed the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, that in the event of a German-Soviet conflict, Japan undertook to attack the USSR. The Soviet embassy in Japan also wrote to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on September 21 that the Japanese newspapers raised a vicious howl against the USSR, wholly in solidarity with the Nazis on the Czechoslovak question. There are calls for turning the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was still ready to fulfill its treaty obligations with respect to Czechoslovakia. For this, the necessary military preparatory measures were taken in advance. As early as June 26, 1938, the Main Military Council of the Red Army adopted a resolution to transform the Belorussian and Kyiv military districts into special military districts. On September 21, in the conditions of a sharply aggravated crisis, instructions were given to put a number of military units on combat readiness. At the same time, other measures were taken to strengthen the troops of the western border military districts and increase their combat readiness. In total, the following were put on alert: 1 tank corps, 30 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, 7 tank, 1 motorized rifle and 12 aviation brigades, etc. 548 combat aircraft were prepared for shipment to Czechoslovakia.

On September 25, 1938, the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR instructed the Soviet Air Force Attache in France, Vasilchenko, to convey the following to the Chief of the General Staff of France, Gamelin:

“Our command has taken the following preventive measures so far:

1. 30 rifle divisions have been advanced to areas immediately adjacent to the western border. The same is done for the cavalry divisions.

2. Parts are accordingly replenished with reservists.

3. As for our technical troops - aviation and tank units, they are in full readiness with us.

The next day, this information was transferred to the French General Staff. In the course of the Anglo-French negotiations that took place in those days, the British government was also informed about them. At the same time, the head of the French government, E. Daladier, spoke especially positively about the Soviet air force, which is not inferior to the German one. The Soviet Union has 5,000 planes, he said, and in Spain, Russian planes fought German planes successfully.

In the last days of September, in the Kiev, Belorussian, Leningrad and Kalinin military districts, another 17 rifle divisions, 22 tank and 3 motorized rifle brigades, etc. were put on alert. The forces of the USSR were additionally called up to a total of up to 330 thousand people.

The above facts clearly indicate that the position of all the main participants in the events under consideration was clearly defined. The fascist aggressors acted more and more brazenly every day. The Polish ruling circles acted in alliance with them. The position of England and France became more and more capitulatory. Not only did they not render any support to Czechoslovakia, but, on the contrary, they helped the fascist Reich in the annexation of the Sudetenland, so that it could carry it out without provoking a general war in Europe, in which the Western powers would also be involved. And only the Soviet Union continued to take a firm and consistent position, resolutely declaring its readiness to fulfill its treaty obligations in relation to Czechoslovakia and to provide it with effective assistance.


Hitler mocks "appeasers"

On September 22, N. Chamberlain, accompanied by G. Wilson and W. Strang, arrived in Bad Godesberg for a new meeting with Hitler. The British Prime Minister, with a clearly pleased look, informed Hitler that he had succeeded in obtaining consent to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany not only from the British, but also from the French and Czechoslovak governments.

Hitler decided, however, to toughen his demands in order to take one more step forward in the elimination of the Czechoslovak state. Quite unexpectedly for Chamberlain, the leader of the German fascists dealt him a pre-prepared blow.

He quipped, "I'm sorry, but that's not enough."

Chamberlain, returning from Munich, declared: "I have brought peace to our generation." 1938

He demanded in an ultimatum that the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany should begin immediately, namely on September 26, and be completed by September 28. At the same time, he now resolutely insisted also on the transfer of certain regions of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary. Finally, he declared that there were no more conditions for the existence of the Czechoslovak state. If his demands were rejected, Hitler threatened war. Reporting on a trip to Bad Godesberg, Chamberlain was forced to admit at a meeting of the British government that as a result of these new demands from Hitler, he was in a state of shock. Despite the increasingly brazen demands of the Nazis, the British Prime Minister still did not stop his attempts to negotiate with them, so that the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany would be "ordered" and not cause a war. Before leaving Bad Godesberg, Chamberlain assured Hitler that he would do everything possible to ensure that his demands were met.


Plans for convening a conference of the aggressors and their patrons

In England and France, the question of convening a conference with the participation of the Western powers and the fascist Reich began to be considered again, in order to decide at it the question of the "peaceful transfer" of the Sudetenland to Germany, that is, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

On September 28, Chamberlain announced in a message to Hitler that he was ready to come to Germany for the third time to discuss the terms of the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. He pointed out that, if Hitler wished, representatives of France and Italy could also take part in the negotiations. At the same time, the English prime minister expressed confidence, that is, in fact, assured Hitler that the fascist Reich in this way would be able to achieve the immediate implementation of its demands without war. The President of the United States, having received a telegram from the American Ambassador in London, John F. Kennedy about the proposal of N. Chamberlain, sent the following message to the British Prime Minister on September 28: "Well done!" ("Good man!"). Kennedy, for his part, told Halifax that he was "genuinely sympathetic" to everything that Chamberlain was doing and "ardently supported" the steps he was taking. Britain and the United States thus acted in complete mutual understanding.

After reaching an agreement to convene a conference of four powers - England, France, Germany and Italy - Halifax informed the Czechoslovak envoy in London about this, who, naturally, could not help but express bewilderment.

“But this is a conference to discuss the fate of my country. Are we not invited to take part in it?

“This is a conference of the great powers.

“Then the Soviet Union is also invited. After all, Russia also has an agreement with my country.

“We didn’t have time to invite the Russians,” the English lord ended the conversation irritably.

W. Churchill very vividly characterized the position of the USSR and England in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary in London on September 29.

“Today Churchill, in a conversation with me,” wrote I. M. Maisky, “spoke with great respect and satisfaction about the behavior of the USSR in the current crisis. In particular, he highly appreciates Litvinov's speech at the Assembly and our note to Poland. The USSR, according to Churchill, is fulfilling its international duty, while England and France capitulate to the aggressors. In this regard, sympathy for the USSR is rapidly growing ... "

As for the position of the British government, Churchill subjected it to the sharpest criticism, noting that it leads "to the inevitable unleashing of war." Chamberlain's desire to "ignore and repel" the USSR, according to Churchill, was "not only ridiculous, but also criminal", and the Anglo-French plan to dismember Czechoslovakia is outrageous.

The West German historian G. Niedhart, who studied in detail the documents of the English archives on the policy of the N. Chamberlain government towards the USSR, stated that it was characterized by "open disregard for the Soviet Union and the desire to isolate it" .


Deal in Munich

On September 29-30, a conference of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, culminating in a deal on tearing away from Czechoslovakia and joining the Reich with a wide strip of territory along the entire German-Czechoslovak border.

At a meeting in Munich, Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler discuss the fate of Czechoslovakia. Munich, September 29

N. Chamberlain and E. Daladier arrived in Munich, having prepared in advance for the surrender. They did not even try to fight against the demands made by Hitler (formally they were made on behalf of Mussolini). On the contrary, Chamberlain and Daladier vied with each other in praise of the almost nobility of these proposals. Hitler subsequently boasted that in Munich Czechoslovakia had been "offered to him on a platter by her friends."

The results of the Munich agreement of the four powers were announced to the representatives of Czechoslovakia as a verdict that was not subject to appeal. G. Wilson was the first to do this before the end of the conference. Appearing in the "waiting room", where the Czechoslovak representatives summoned to Munich had been anxiously waiting for this verdict for several hours, he decided to make them happy.

- Almost everything is decided. You will be pleased to know that we have reached an agreement on almost all issues.

And what is our fate?

“Not as bad as it could be.

And Wilson showed on the map a strip smeared with red ink, covering from the north, west and south almost half of the territory of Czechoslovakia and including almost the entire defensive line of the country.

- It's outrageous! This is cruel and criminally stupid!

Sorry, but it's useless to argue.

Thus, Chamberlain and Daladier agreed in Munich to collude with the aggressors, to capitulate to them, shamefully betraying Czechoslovakia and assisting the fascist aggressors in dismembering it.

British Prime Minister Chamberlain signs the Munich Agreement. 1938

Of course, these four powers did not have the slightest legal basis for arrogating to themselves the right to decide on the division of Czechoslovakia. Since this deal was a gross violation of the sovereign rights of the Czechoslovak state and was imposed on Czechoslovakia under the threat of force, it was illegal.

F. Roosevelt considered it an honor to join the company of "Munich peacekeepers". He sent Chamberlain a congratulatory telegram through his ambassador in London, J. Kennedy. Although Kennedy also fully supported the policy of condoning German aggression, he nevertheless understood that later it would not add honor to its creators. And so he showed a certain foresight. Having received the telegram, he went to 10 Downing Street, but instead of handing Chamberlain the text of the telegram, he only read it out.

“I had the feeling,” he later wrote, “that someday this telegram would turn against Roosevelt, and I kept it to myself.”

After the four-party talks ended in Munich, Chamberlain expressed a desire to speak face to face with Hitler. Hitler agreed. The British Prime Minister attached absolutely exceptional significance to this conversation. After all, for him the Munich agreement on the partition of Czechoslovakia was rather a means to an end. The goal was to work out an agreement between the British Empire and the fascist Reich on all issues of interest to both sides, in order to divert German aggression from the Western powers and direct it to the east. The ruling circles of England hoped that now, after the satisfaction of the demand so sharply set by Hitler regarding the Sudetenland, the situation was most favorable for starting a business conversation about such an agreement.

Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich in 1938.

Chamberlain, in the course of his conversation with Hitler, quite transparently outlined his foreign policy program. Considering it necessary to demonstrate his negative attitude towards the USSR, the British Prime Minister noted that Hitler should no longer be afraid that Czechoslovakia would be used as a springboard for "Russian aggression." He further emphasized that Hitler should not be afraid that Britain would pursue a policy of military and economic encirclement of Germany in Southeastern Europe.

So, England is not interested in Czechoslovakia and South-Eastern Europe, and she treats Russia as her worst enemy. Take heed, they say, and act!

What, however, interested England? Chamberlain stressed that the main thing was to improve Anglo-German relations. And then he offered Hitler for everything that England had already done for the German aggressors and promised for the future to sign the Anglo-German declaration of non-aggression.

Hitler did not resist, and immediately this declaration was signed. In essence, it was an agreement on non-aggression and consultations between England and Germany. The leader of the German fascists considered it possible to somewhat sweeten the Munich capitulation for the English prime minister, since it was important for him to strengthen Chamberlain's position.

“The thirsty,” Mussolini remarked on this occasion, “do not refuse a glass of water.”

The signing of this declaration, however, did not mean at all that Nazi Germany was going to adhere to it. On the contrary, the Nazis there, in Munich, continued negotiations with Mussolini on the conclusion of a German-Italian-Japanese alliance in order to prepare for a war against England and France. Ribbentrop stated immediately after the end of the conference that Chamberlain "today signed the death warrant of the British Empire and left us to set the date for the execution of this sentence."


Munich - a step towards war

The ruling circles of Britain and France, when concluding the Munich Agreement, attached particular importance to its anti-Soviet sharpness. This is clearly evidenced by the materials cited above on the discussion of the most important foreign policy issues in the British government. The same is clear from the then diplomatic documents of the USA, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and other countries. Thus, the Polish ambassador in London, E. Raczynski, wrote, referring to Munich, that in England the opinion prevails that Chamberlain "protected the English gates and thus transferred the game to the east of Europe." On October 4, 1938, the French ambassador to Moscow, R. Coulondre, for his part, noted that the Munich agreement “endangers the Soviet Union especially strongly. After the neutralization of Czechoslovakia, Germany opened the way to the southeast. Lord Lothian, who was soon appointed British ambassador to the United States, noted that in connection with Munich, "political circles in London believed that Hitler, after the capture of Czechoslovakia ... would move to Ukraine." “Everyone in Europe expected this,” he emphasized. Allen Dulles, referring to "missed opportunities", said that after Munich, all of South-Eastern Europe could gradually come under German rule, after which "it would be easy for her to wage a war on one front against Russia" .

The anti-Soviet underpinnings of the Munich conspiracy of the four powers are not hidden by some Western historians either. The English historian J. Wheeler-Bennet notes that among the ruling circles of England during the period of Munich “there was a secret hope that if it were possible to turn the direction of German aggression to the east, then it would use up its strength in the Russian steppes in a struggle that would exhaust both belligerents sides".

The well-known American publicist and columnist W. Lippman also testifies to this. He wrote that England's Munich policy was based on "the hope that Germany and Russia would find themselves at war and bleed each other out."

The German historian B. Tselovsky admits that the Soviet government during the entire pre-Munich period tried to achieve a change in the "policy of appeasement" in order to create a united front against the aggressors. “Chamberlain and Bonnet did everything possible to eliminate the Soviet Union. For ideological and power politics reasons they were against cooperation with the Soviets. The governments of France and Great Britain were guided in their foreign policy "not by the principles of democracy and law, but by anti-Sovietism."

Even Lord Halifax's biographer F. Birkenhead is forced to admit that during the entire Czechoslovak crisis there was no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union took its offers of assistance to Czechoslovakia seriously and that it would fulfill its obligations. Therefore, it was extremely important to openly have the USSR as an ally, and "it can be considered an unforgivable mistake that measures were not taken to achieve this."

On March 15, 1939, by decree of the Chancellor of Germany, A. Hitler, the Czech Republic and Moravia were declared a protectorate of Germany.

“Future historians, after a thousand years, will try in vain to comprehend the secrets of our politics. They will never be able to understand how it happened that a people that won a victory, having something for its soul, stooped to such a fall, let go to the wind everything that it won as a result of immeasurable sacrifices and decisive triumph over the enemy. They will not understand why the victors were defeated, and those who laid down their arms on the battlefield and prayed for a truce are now going to dominate the world.
from Churchill's speech in the English Parliament on March 24, 1937.

During the signing of the Munich Agreement. From left to right: Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini and Ciano


From the very beginning of his political activity, Hitler conducted active propaganda among the German population about the suffering and terrible living conditions of several million Germans living in Czechoslovakia in the Sudetes (about 90% of the region's population), Slovakia and Transcarpathian Ukraine (Carpathian Germans) and under the yoke of the Slavic population countries. The reasons for the appearance of the Germans in this area go back to the 13th century, when the Czech kings invited settlers to deserted areas on the borders of the Czech kingdom. The situation began to worsen when Germany openly began to support fascist-type parties in the Sudetenland. One of them, the national separatist party of Konrad Henlein, won the elections in 1935. Provocations and riots organized by this gang of Hitler's henchmen heated the atmosphere in the Sudetenland, and the government of Czechoslovakia had to take a number of retaliatory measures (representation of the Germans in the National Assembly, local self-government, education in the native language) designed to reduce tension in the region. But in April, Henlein's completely insolent party threateningly put forward demands for the autonomy of the region. At the same time, German military units began to move, located near the Czechoslovak border. In response, with the support of the USSR and France, the Czechoslovak troops occupy the Sudetenland. Frightened, Hitler sends Henlein to negotiations with the Czechoslovak government, which, however, lead to nothing and end on September 7 after a series of provoked riots and clashes between the Sudeten Germans and regular troops. Hitler publicly declares that he sincerely wants peace, but if the government of Czechoslovakia does not withdraw troops from the Sudetenland, he will be forced to start a war. On a mission to "save the whole world," Chamberlain meets him on September 15 in the Bavarian Alps. On it, the Führer convincingly proves that territories inhabited by more than 50 percent of Germans are obliged to pass to Germany, allegedly on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. Chamberlain agrees, and Great Britain, and later France, act as guarantors of the new borders of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, the envoys of these great powers announce an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government, which was limply accepted by President Edvard Beneš. After that, a general strike was declared in the country, protest demonstrations and a change of government took place, and a general mobilization was announced. The flight of Jews, Czechs and German anti-fascists begins from the Sudetenland. Even without the support of France, the USSR declares its readiness to fulfill its obligations to defend Czechoslovakia. There are official documents that Moscow has offered Prague very specific plans for assistance in the use of ground forces and the transfer of fighters in order to strengthen the capabilities of the Czechoslovak military aviation. On the southwestern and western borders, rifle divisions, tank units, aviation and air defense forces of our country were put on alert. But then Poland announced that it would not let the Red Army through its territory, warning of a blow to the flank in the event of the advancement of Soviet troops and the destruction of any aircraft flying over its airspace. The decisive factor was the refusal to help Czechoslovakia itself, which, obviously, Stalin inspired no less fear than Hitler.

It is also known that England and France put pressure on Czechoslovakia: “If the Czechs unite with the Russians, the war may take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then it will be very difficult for the governments of England and France to stand aside.”

Seeing the mobilization of the Czechoslovak military, Hitler informs the ambassadors of England and France that he is being forced to start a war. Continuous columns of soldiers, armed from head to toe, grimly march through the streets of Berlin.

Chamberlain (left) and Hitler meeting in Bad Godesberg, September 23, 1938. In the middle is the chief translator Dr. Paul Schmidt

On September 26, at the Berlin Sports Palace, the Fuhrer declared: "If by October 1, the Sudetenland is not transferred to Germany, I, Hitler, myself will go, as the first soldier, against Czechoslovakia."
Here he proclaimed: "After the Sudeten-German question is settled, we will not have any further territorial claims in Europe ... We do not need the Czechs."

Chamberlain immediately assures Hitler that everything will work out "without war and without delay." To resolve this issue on September 29, 1938, the heads of governments of Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France (Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier, respectively) gathered in Hitler's Munich residence "Fuhrerbau".

On September 28, an emergency meeting of the English House of Commons was held. Chamberlain addressed the House: “I must make an additional message to the House. Herr Hitler announces that he invites me to meet him tomorrow morning in Munich. Members of Parliament, dreaming of an agreement with Hitler, greeted this statement with thunderous applause.

At 12:45 p.m., a conference of plenipotentiaries opened in the Brown House. Contrary to Chamberlain's promise, Czechoslovak envoys were not admitted, and the USSR was denied participation altogether. During the two-day negotiations, the fate of Czechoslovakia was finally decided. Its representatives were invited and announced in a "recommendatory" form a verdict - to transfer to Germany the Sudetenland and areas bordering the former Austria, with all property, including weapons and fortifications. Czechoslovakia was supposed to clear the transferred territories from 1 to 10 October. The agreement also prescribed to settle the issue of the Polish and Hungarian national minorities in the country, which meant the rejection of other parts of its territory from Czechoslovakia in favor of Poland and Hungary. The Munich Agreement was signed at one in the morning on September 30, 1938 by Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini. Vojtech Mastny and Hubert Masaryk also signed the treaty on behalf of the Czechoslovak people. In case of non-fulfilment, France disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of Czechoslovakia from German aggression.

Returning from Munich to London, Chamberlain at the gangway said: "I brought peace to our generation."
Daladier was already met at the airport by a huge crowd shouting: “Long live Daladier! Long live the world!
Churchill assessed the results of Munich in a completely different way: “England had to choose between war and disgrace. Its ministers have chosen disgrace in order to get war.”
Welcoming Chamberlain in the House of Commons, Churchill sullenly said: “Do not think that this is the end. This is just the beginning of the payoff. This is the first sip. The first foretaste of that bitter cup that will be offered to us year after year.

Édouard Daladier (center) with Joachim von Ribbentrop at a meeting in Munich in 1938

The Munich Agreement became an exemplary example of a betrayal committed on a national scale, and the culminating point of the English "policy of appeasement". The French could easily mobilize an army in order to throw the German units out of the Rhine zone within a few hours, but they did not. Everyone wanted Germany to move east, finally attacking our country.

The French ambassador in Moscow, Robert Coulondre, noted: “The Munich agreement is a particularly strong threat to the Soviet Union. After the neutralization of Czechoslovakia, Germany opened the way to the southeast. This is also stated in the diplomatic documents of France, Germany, Italy, the USA, Poland and a number of other countries.
The slogan of the British Conservatives at the time was: "For Britain to live, Bolshevism must die."

On the territory of the Sudetes, after October 1, 1938, Czech parties, the Czech language, books, newspapers and much more were banned. Under pressure from Germany, the Czechoslovak government on October 7 recognized the autonomy of Slovakia, and on October 8 a conclusion was made on granting autonomy to Transcarpathian Ukraine. Even earlier, on October 1, Poland presented Czechoslovakia with ultimatum demands, supported by the Nazis, for the transfer of the Teszyn region to it. Thus, the split, devoid of border fortifications and economically drained of blood, the country turned out to be defenseless against the Nazi invaders. In March 1939, the Nazis began the final liquidation of Czechoslovakia as a state. On the night of March 14-15, the President of the Czech Republic Hacha, summoned to Berlin, signed Hitler's statement on the inadmissibility of any resistance to the invasion of German troops.

On the same day, Hitler declared: "I am not boasting, but I must say that I did it really elegantly."

On March 15, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, which remained from the once united Czechoslovakia, declaring a protectorate over them. The Germans took no steps to keep their actions secret, but there was no protest from the Western powers.

To all questions, Chamberlain only answered: "Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a result of internal disintegration."
Daladier demanded to suppress the protest of the Communist Party. The Plenipotentiary of the USSR in France wrote: “The majority of the chamber answered this demand with a thunderous ovation. A more shameful spectacle could hardly be imagined ... ".

The Soviet Union was the only country willing to help the Czechoslovak Republic. But the ruling circles of that country did not accept our support this time either.

The Soviet government declared: "We cannot recognize the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the German Empire, and in one form or another also Slovakia, lawful and in accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination of peoples."

As a result of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, one of the forces that could potentially serve the cause of defeating the Nazis disappeared in the center of Europe. When Hitler visited this "new territory of the Reich", he expressed his joy that the Wehrmacht did not have to storm the lines of the Czechoslovak defenses, for which the Germans would have to pay dearly. From a military point of view, Germany's gain was enormous. The Wehrmacht acquired excellent army weapons and factories that produced these weapons, and after all, the industry of Czechoslovakia was at that time one of the most developed in Europe. Before the attack on the USSR, out of 21 Wehrmacht tank divisions, 5 were equipped with Czechoslovak-made tanks. Germany also received all the trump cards for an attack on Poland from several directions, which until the very end fancied itself an ally of Germany and, together with it, merrily dismembered Czechoslovakia. But after a few months, Poland was gone, and Slovak soldiers were photographed against the backdrop of burnt houses and Polish prisoners of war.

The Munich model did not work. The war began in the West, culminating in the shameful capitulation of France, a change of cabinet in England, and the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition according to the scheme proposed by the Soviet Union back in 1935. England came to its senses, a little later the United States, and then France under the leadership of de Gaulle jumped on the bandwagon of the departing train. In 1942, Great Britain and France, in 1944 Italy, in 1950 the GDR and in 1973 the FRG declared the Munich Agreement initially invalid.